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The Foolosophy of Justice and the Enigma
of Law
Peter Goodrich*
in imagine ambulat homo'
When lawyers use images in juristic texts, what is their legal meaning?
Specifically, when legal texts print pictures of Justice and of Justice
blindfolded, as they did particularly in the sixteenth century in legally
authored emblem books and works of doctrine, then what is their
significance for lawyers? And more specifically still, what is the proper
interpretation of the blindfold, which we find not only on Justice (Justitia)
but also on juristic representations of Cupid, Fate (Fortuna), bridegrooms,
and the condemned? My answer, I will not tease or otherwise keep you
waiting, is that the image of Justitia is technically an aenigma iuris, a
legal symbol whose referent has been forgotten.2
My initial proof, my text, my image, will be a paradoxical one taken
from a legal treatise, Barth6lemy Aneau's Jurisprudentia, a somewhat
hagiographical history of jurisprudence first published in 1554. My focus
will be on the figure of Justitia used immediately following a textual
discussion of mythological sources of legal rule and of the homines sacer,
the holy interpreters of law. While I will show that the figure, which
pictures Justitia on a pedestal, sighted and reading from a book of the
laws to an audience of blindfolded lawyers, is paradoxically a didactic
and moralizing excursus in political theology, there is a further
* Professor of Law, Director of Law and Humanities, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
Yeshiva University.
1. Psalms 39:6 (Vulgate).
2. The term derives from ANTONIO DE NEBRIJA, AENIGMATA LURIS CIUILIS (1506), republished
under differing titles in later editions. I have used a 1612 edition titled VOCABULARIUM UTRISUQUE
IURIS (Venice, Zalterium 1612). For extended discussion, see Peter Goodrich, Legal Enigmas:
Antonio de Nebrga, The Da Vinci Code, and the Emendation ofLaw, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 71
(2010).
3. BARTHtLEMY ANEAU, JURISPRUDENTIA 10 (Lyon, Bonhomme 1554). For a discussion of the
context of the work, see Marie Madeleine Fontaine, Barthilemy Aneau et la Jurisprudentia, in
ESCULAPE ET DIONYSUS: MtLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE JEAN CtARD 1001 (Jean Dupbbe et al. eds.,
2008). For an extended deliberation upon the use of emblems by lawyers, see VALtRIE HAYAERT,
MENS EMBLEMATICA ET HUMANISME JURIDIQUE (2008).
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conundrum.4 The specific image upon which I am focusing derives from a
text published a year earlier: the Toulousean lawyer Guillaume de la
Perridre's Foolosophy, composed in 1552 and printed in 1553.'
The question, the issue, the recollection of what was once a
commonplace, the emblem as a legal device, as a mode and medium of
the theater of justice and truth, as a tool of memory and imagination,
eloquence and wisdom, far outstretches the purposes of the current
Figure 1. Emblem from Jurisprudentia, Barth6lemy Aneau, page 10, 1554,
Lyon, Bonhomme.
Reproduced courtesy of the Bibliothdque nationle de France.
4. Figure 1.
5. GUILLAUME DE LA PERRlIRE, LA MOROSOPHIE: CONTENANT CENT EMBLEMES MORAUX,
ILLUSTREZ DE CENT TESTRASTIQUES LATINS (1553). La Perribre was also author of the first vernacular
emblem book, LE THEATRE DES BONS ENGINS (1539/1540), which appeared later in an intriguing
English adaptation by THOMAS COMBE, THE THEATRE OF FINE DEVICES (London, Field 1614).
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digression in pictorial interpretation. Nonetheless, a certain degree of
context and specifically a reference to the role of images, to the visual
grammar of the early modem period and its crucial facility in relaying
memory and motive, genealogy and norm, are requisite. Images-
imagines agentes-were active forms, the motors of tradition and
professional practice, and bore a technical meaning that derived in theory
at least from the ancient art of the hieroglyph and the holy letters, the
"hierographie," of a veritably antique and carefully shrouded law. "The
wisest of the ancient authors," observes Giulo Camillo in the opening
lines of his Theatre of Memory, "would never expose divine secrets in
their writings except under cover of enigmas and veils . . . so that they
could not be understood except by those whom God had chosen to
apprehend the holy mysteries." These signs belong, he continues, "to the
divine army, to the angelic trumpeters, to the order of the Prophets and
Preachers, and are the insignia, which is to say the signs and visions
which signify without expressing. "6
I will argue in what follows that the humanist lawyers, doctors all as
they explicitly were of knowledge "divine and human," and so also of
utrumque ius, a dual law, belong firmly within the tradition of
hieroglyphic signs, of visual tropes and obscure figures that convey the
holy knowledge and practice of law. Barth6lemy Aneau expressly writes
within this generously expansive humanist poetics of law, a juristic
tradition that self-consciously mixes erudition and esotericism, poetry and
justice, image and written law. My initial analysis will thus focus upon
the legal reception and interpretation of the hieroglyphic tradition. The
alphabet of images, the standard pictorial topoi that lawyers inherited and
used, were drawn from the dictionaries of visual figures derived from
Horapollo and Piero Valeriano, the first authors to provide a lexicon of
these "Aegyptian" symbols.' The image as it grew to be used in the ius
imaginum, the law of the visual, was a complex sign variously indicating
honor, title, office, and role. The heraldic device, the first form of social
6. GIuLIo CAMILLO, TH ATRE DE LA MEMOIRE 43-44 (Allia 2001) (1544). For discussion, see
FRANCES YATES, THE ART OF MEMORY 129-72 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1966). Further inquiry into
this concept would lead, I suspect, to Heraclitus and the opaque maxim that nature loves to hide,
which Pierre Hadot has done so much to elaborate and translate in PIERRE HADOT, THE VEIL OF ISIS
(2007). My thanks to Ruth Weisberg for reminding me of, though I must add that it is not for me so
much a question here of memory as of forgetting, damnatio memoriae, that other curiosity of Roman
law, that most appeals.
7. The chief sources were HORAPOLLO, THE HIEROGLYPHICS OF HORAPOLLO (George Boas
trans., 1950) (1505); and PIERO VALERIANO, HIEROGLYPHICA (Basle, Isengrin 1556). That lawyers
readily took up the theme of the hieroglyphic character of knowledge is evident most obviously in
NEBRIJA, supra note 2. A later example from common law is ABRAHAM FRAUNCE, SYMBOLICAE
PHILOSOPHIAE LIBER QUARTUS ET ULTIMUS (AMS Press 1991) (1590), which presents a list of
symbolic figures and their meanings at the end of the work. The general history of visual
representations of honor can be found in the English version of Jovius, SAMUEL DANIEL, THE
WORTHY TRACT OF PAULUS JOVIUS (Scholar's Facsimiles 1976) (1585).
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emblem, was a note of dignity (notitia dignitatum) which lawyers had
long employed to indicate identity and jurisdiction, office and role. It
belonged to a carefully transcribed tradition of enigmatic figures that had
the dual purpose of identifying and concealing through that arcane
mixture of classical pictorial symbols, Latin mottos and vernacular verses
that came to make up the emblem tradition. I will then propose, with a
crescendo of images, that the figure of Justice belongs precisely within
this shrouded and dark tradition and that the emblematic usage of
blindfolds and other paradoxically visual indicia is equally there in the
service of enigmatic and initiate meanings. As has long been suggested by
non-lawyers, the signs of law, its foreign languages, its prolixity, its
convolution, and increasingly its images, are in significant measure not
supposed to be understood but rather to be observed, revered, and obeyed.
The images are flags, ensigns, symbola heroica, the choral identificatory
insignia that a populace can follow but only the few, the iuris periti, the
legally learned of whom there are ever fewer to be found today in the
trade schools that generally pass for legal academies, can properly
interpret and understand.8 It is necessary to take a stand in support of the
importance of the visual. We have to look at the overlooked and learn to
address the significance of the "visial lines," as Coke once termed it, the
visible structures and plastic forms that constitute the immediate and
recognized presence of law. These construct the longue dure of
normativity, and relay the imaginary of justice that lawyers sometimes
remember to address as the dictates of conscience. The last point to be
perambulated will thus be the careful reconstruction of the specific image
of Justice that Aneau uses, in its context of related legal emblems, to
allow me to evidence and interpret the figure in its proper juristic place,
that of a forgotten and thus subsisting political theology of law.
I. FIGURES OF IDENTITY AND EXCLUSION
I will start as I intend to continue, with an image, ad apparentiam, so as
to provide the feel for the visual associations that will form the trajectory
of what follows. Pierre Coustau's Pegma, published in 1555, is perhaps
the most self-consciously juridical and most carefully annotated book of
legal emblems aside from the 1531 compilation of Alciatus's Emblemata.9
8. See SIR JOHN FERNE, THE BLAZON OF GENTRIE (London, Winder 1586); and CLAUDE
PARADIN, THE HEROICAL DEVICES (1557) on symbola heroica. BARTOLUS OF SASSAFERATO,
TRACTUS DE INSIGNILS ET ARMIs (1358), reprinted in A GRAMMAR OF SIGNS: BARTOLO DA
SASSOFERRATO'S TRACT ON INSIGNIA AND COATS OF ARMS (Osvaldo Cavallar et al. eds. & trans.,
1994), is the acknowledged source.
9. I have used ANDREAS ALCIATUS, I THE LATIN EMBLEMS (Peter Daly ed., 1985). The various
editions and vernacular interpretations can be consulted most easily and usefully at the GLASGOW
UNIVERSITY EMBLEM WEBSITE, http://www.emblems.arts.gla.ac.uk/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
144 [Vol. 24:141
4
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol24/iss1/7
Goodrich
Indeed the most expansive commentary on Alciatus post dates Coustau
and is Mignault's Syntagma de Symbolis, published in 1577.10 The title,
the very notion of Pegma, of theatrical machines that raise and lower
actors and props to the stage, already provides an excellent sense of what
the Emblemata itself intends to do." These images enact and make
present the norms that found the law. They bring the virtues of legal rule
to social visibility. They show jurisprudence to be the "image of the
public good." And in Coustau's case they also allow for lengthy
discussions of an antique law that needs both custody and transmission to
a new generation enthused by the novel technology of print. The Pegma,
which provides a reasoned visual presentation of a range of emblematic
norms, begins with three emblems of Justice. I select the second,
"Another image of justice, after Nigidus."l 2
The image is of Justice seated in the clouds, her head amongst the stars,
her sword cleaving a path between the constellations, between Libra and
Leo, the scales and the lion, as we are informed in the verse explanation
that usefully follows in Latin. In emblematic argot, the image is a version
of the opening injunction of the Institutes of Justinian, which declares that
the Emperor is not simply honored by arms but also armed by laws.
Hence the sword, symbolizing the earthly dominion of the heavenly lion,
the threat of arms, the fearful force that majesty can inflict. Note also,
however, the insignia that are missing. There is no scale in the left hand of
Justice, nor any blindfold over her eyes. There is a band of cloth-in
English emblem literature, "a skarfe"-that flows behind her and signifies
chance. But she is sighted and indeed from her heavenly perspective is in
a position of panopticism if not omnivoyance. Certainly according to the
philosophical narration and the motto, in sordid iudicantes, against
corrupt judges, Justice looks down upon dissolution and venality. She
sees the winds of chance, the rolling of Fortuna's dice that stands for
human justice, and hence the band that trails behind her. Video et rideo, I
look and I laugh, is one relatively common association with the heavenly
eye, indicating the all powerful character of divine optics and the futility
of human attempts to hide their crimes from sovereign view. The sighted
Justice aloft, in nubibus, flies with a band of cloth, a flag, a potential
10. PIERRE COUSTAU, PEGMA CUM NARRATIONIBUS PHILOSOPHICIS (Lyon, Bonhomme 1555).
11. HAYAERT, supra note 3, at 49-78, discusses a dazzling array of sources and evidences a
theatrical meaning of "putting before the eyes." The theatrical is also, of course, the express setting of
la Perribre's first vernacular emblem book, and Thomas Combe in his translation notes that words "do
passe the Reader without due consideration," whereas devices have the virtue of "pictures that
especially are discerned by the sense, are such helps to the weaknes of the common understandings,
that they make words as it were deedes . . . ." (n.p. "To the Reader"). NEBRIJA, supra note 2, notes





Goodrich: The Foolosophy of Justice and the Enigma of Law
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
blindfold perhaps, trailing behind her. And the image serves most likely to
remind the viewer of the partiality and criminality that the heavens
witness in our earthly behavior. A blindfold in this context would spare
Justice an unseemly sight and serve also to protect and separate the divine
from the human, the heavens from the earth, portrayed so self-consciously
below in the mode of barren rock and a weeping tree.
Figure 2. Emblem from Pegma: cum narrationibus philosophicis, Pierre Coustau, page
a6r, 1555, Lyon, Matthias Bonhomme.
Reproduced courtesy of the Rare Book Collection, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School.
Given that the astrological and Latin references of the emblem are
opaque to all but the most well-trained viewers, the general sense of the
image is of Justice as a feminine divinity on high, an apparition that
represents a divine and unknowable order, an angelic chorus and heavenly
sphere that cannot normally be seen, will not be comprehended, and must
rather be addressed through faith, approached with reverence, and
apprehended by means of awe. Our early lawyers tell us as much. We
must judge, according to the fifteenth century Chief Justice Fortescue,
explicitly as sacerdotes, "with downcast eyes," reverently, with the
appropriate filial fear of the sacred author of laws. We are children, and
God is the father to whom all reverence and glory are owed. Coustau is to
the same effect, stating in his commentary that "splendor and dignity" are
146 [Vol. 24:141
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the primary attributes of sacred justice.' 3 Coustau's image requires-to
borrow a term-"dualisis,"' 4 a double reading in which lawyers and
divine interpreters have long been trained. The image is a site of
attachment, a flag that identifies, names, and leads the group. It is also,
however, veritas falsa, a false truth, which hides and deceives, if only or
not least because it is not what it represents.
To represent Justice as a god, and this is hardly a novel point, is to
identify but also to remove the object viewed. The divinity hides so as to
veil the sources of sovereign counsel. Thus in an image of the deity
Consus, this time from Guillaume de la Perribre, we see graphically
represented not only the genuflection, abasement, and reverence that
institute a hierarchy, but also the bars, the cancellarius, and the grill,
which obscures the divinity and keeps her out, excluded from the diurnal
and human.' 5 This visual trope of bars and separation, of the reja, of an
Figure 3. Emblem from La Morosophie, Guillaume de la
Perribre, page 88, 1555, Lyon, Bonhomme.
Reproduced courtesy of the University of Glasgow Library, Special Collections.
13. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE NATURA LEGIS NATURAE 276 (London, Private Circulation
1869) (ca. 1460); COUSTAU, supra note 10, at a7r.
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enshrined yet exiled source of sovereign rule takes us to the question of
the juristic image quite directly. The picture, the visible sign, is the most
public mode of declaration of nobility, office, sovereignty, and rule. It is
the subject matter of the ius imaginum, the law of images, to be sure, but
best translated as law of honor, of the auratic and unseen dimensions of
justice and legislation. The hieroglyphic character of legal symbols,
frequently and expressly referred to in terms of the Pythagorean and
Druidic roots of common law, is a reference precisely to the human
condition of unsightedness, the blindness and ignorance of mortals in the
face of the law of nature, and to the divine rule that the symbol encodes
and veils. Legal images are not legal inventions. They are images first,
mnemonic, opaque, hieratic, and hieroglyphic. They are not meant to be
understood but rather to impress, to impose, and to pass on a structure of
rule, a lineage of succession, a thread of legitimacy that must be viewed-
observed-yet neither too fully inquired into nor too generally
understood. He who does not know how to dissimulate does not know
how to rule, or so our authors are fond of noting.
As the progeny of a theological order and Christian rule, the legal
image is initially an image of honor, a sign of sanctity, and is owed
reverence prior to any exercise in understanding. Borrowing from
Nebrija's Aenigmata iuris, the image belongs initially and expressly to the
iconomus, the order of ecclesiastically controlled visibilities, an
iconocracy that impresses and imposes much more than it actually
administrates and governs." The other law, be it defined as divine and
natural, or immemorial and common, pre-exists and surpasses
understanding. Humans, lawyers, have access only to parts of these holy
notations in the dual form of pictures and symbols. First, there is the
apprehension of honor and the recognition of the mediation of such
auratic images, such "visible words," through the rites and ceremonies,
solemnizations and choruses of the institution. For the Anglican Church,
and here it is necessary to be specific, the theology of venerating an
invisible source of law means recognizing that the external eye can see
very little, almost nothing. This is because the eye of the body can
observe only things that are, whereas the interior eye, the vision of the
spirit, oculi animi, has much greater range according to Bishop John
Jewel, citing the Church father Chrysostom: "the bodily eyes that see
things visible, cannot do so much, as the eyes of the spirit. For these eyes
are able to see the things, that be not seen, and have no being."17 The
16. ANTONIO DE NEBRUA, VOCABULARIUM UTRISUQUE lURIS 151r (Venice, Marcum Zalterium
1612) (1506). The notion of iconocracy comes from MARIE JOSt MONDZAIN, L'IMAGE PEUT-ELLE
TUER 8 (2002) ("Ce qu'on peut nommer un iconocratie se met en place.").
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visible world is simply "a spectacle of things invisible,"" a glass through
which we see darkly, as Saint Paul famously expounds it: nunc videmus
per speculum in aenigmata, tunc autem faciem adfaciem.19
The legal conception of signs follows directly from this dualytic
regimen. The sign is split between iconomic and oeconomic, between
iconic and symbolic elaborations. The synoptic work of the Jesuit
philosopher Menestrier provides the clearest schema of this division in
practice when he charts the bifurcation of "hierograpie" as between
hieroglyph and symbol, picture and writing. Notes, sculptures, paintings,
form the body of devices and emblems, while the symbol, the writing, the
voice, is the soul.20 The visual order hides the invisible structure of causes
and meanings, and in the language of the authors of the early texts on
devices, the figure-the body-is a vestige, the imprint and mark of that
of which it is the symbol (impress). Abraham Fraunce, author of the
Lawiers Logike of 1588, puts it strikingly as follows: a symbol is by
definition a mode of concealment. It is expressly a synecdoche, a part of a
larger and invisible whole.21 Hence the need for the lexicon of figures that
Fraunce provides at the end of his systematic treatise on Armorial
insignia, emblems, hieroglyphs and symbols. The first order of the sign
and the primary meaning of symbols relate thus to an invisible dominion,
to a realm in which rex regnat sed non gubernat, in which choral
acclamation and visible glory precede all action and use.22 Turn then to
the earliest of the modem treatises on legal signs, Gerard Legh's The
Accedens of Armory, first published in 1562.23 It begins, the specification
is hardly necessary, with an image of Justice alongside the other virtues,
with the proper accoutrements, the visual lineaments of law. More
surprising and intriguing, however, is the image of the legal herald, that
immediately precedes the peroration of the work in the mode of an
acclamation of the "houses of honour," the earthly form of the angelic
18. JAMES CALFHILL, AN ANSWERE TO THE TREATISE ON THE CROSSE, at fol. 169v (London,
Denham 1565) (continuing in Pauline fashion to argue that it "is a glass to behold the secret working
and hidden grace of God").
19. 1 Corinthians 13:12.
20. FRANCOIS MENESTRIER, LA PHILOSOPHIE DES IMAGES COMPOSEE D'UN AMPLE RECEUIL DES
DEVISES 72-73 (Paris, Caille 1682).
21. ABRAHAM FRAUNCE, INSIGNIUM ARMORUM, EMBLEMATUM, HIEROGLYPHICORUM ET
SYMBOLORUM, at fol. M2r (London, Orwin 1588) (borrowing in his turn from Claude Mignault,
Syntagma de symbolis, in OMNIA ANDREA ALCIATI V.C. EMBLEMATA: CUM COMMENTARIIS 71
(Antwerp, Plantin 1577)).
22. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, LE RtGNE ET LA GLOIRE: POUR UN GENEALOGIE DU GOUVERNEMENT
(2008). For elaboration on the theme of power and glory, see Peter Goodrich, Specters of Law: Why
the History of the Legal Spectacle has not been Written, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. (forthcoming 2012).
23. GERARD LEGH, THE ACCEDENS OF ARMORY, at fol. 133r (London, Totell 1576). Legh refers
to NICHOLAS UPTON, DE STUDIO MILITARI LIBER QUATOR (London, Norton 1654) (ca. 1434) as his
inspiration, along with BARTOLUS, supra note 8.
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order extant in the Inns of Court, expressly named the temples of law.24
Legh's herald is a remarkable emblem at the end of a lengthy
systematization-a rational exposition-of the visual alphabet of colors,
metals, animals, and figures used in the making of devises. These
Figure 4. Emblem from The Accedens of Armory, Gerard Legh,
fol. 133r, 1576, London, Totell.
Permission granted, P. Goodrich.
devices-impresa and symbols-named and identified the nobility, a
word whose root is not incidentally taken to be the Latin nosco, to
know.2 5 They are those who know more and so accommodate and present
a greater dignity and louder claim of proximity to glory and, for our
purposes, to the sources of sovereign rule. Be that as it may, the herald of
the houses of honor, of the order of visible laws, is simply dressed. In our
image he bears the royal shield on his chest and a "chemise blank" spotted
with "mullets sable" (black spurs). Borrowing, or so Legh claims, from
24. Figure 4.
25. FERNE, supra note 8, at 4.
150 [Vol. 24:141
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Bartolus, the subscript explanation indicates that what is significant is not
the clothing but the message, not the person but the sign conveyed.26 As
for the picture itself, the herald points with the rod of office to the flag,
which shows a panther, the most valued and amiable of animals. In the
lexicon that Legh provides, he explains that it is this sign that is the
magnet that draws all other animals to it, while the dragon, the most
feared of beasts, protects the sign. The image on the flag is that of
collectivity, of an identity that is to be followed, a mark of sociality, of all
that is most dear and sacred and of that which has to be protected at all
costs. This analysis could be extended, and should include the quotation
from the maxim in the center of the emblem, familiar to Plowden and his
contemporaries, which indicates that reason is law and law is reason. For
Legh it is a question of legal authority guaranteeing and providing reason,
in that order: law first, reason second; authority and then disposition. And
we read in Coke's Institutes a comparable alignment and foundational
principle of legality: "si soient en semblable reason sont en semblable
ley." The bizarre law French is Coke's not mine, but translates, just to be
fair to the student editors, as "if they are similar in reason they are likely
law," to which it should only be added that the similarities that bind
reason and law extend way beyond the merely visible.27 For what is at
issue, and is always at issue for Coke, is reason true and legal not merely
apparent, or in the proper and actual language of such juridical veracity
"ratio vera et legalis et non apparens."28 The reason for this, which
returns ultimately to the Pythagorean and Aegyptian roots of common law
symbolism, is captured well by Ovid in the maxim that the image, like the
word, is always more than it seems, more than is apparent: plus est quam
quod videantur imago.
The English escutcheon, the flag, the association of power with reason
and law, allow for my second point. If iconomus, the order of iconic
images and public evidence of divine being is a matter for the church and
the higher law, an instance of glory, laudes regia and acclamation, then
the order of signs, of oeconomus, is simply a vicarious and secondary
expression of hierarchy and holiness. Having indicated that the flag is
sacred, and that no disrespect must ever be done even to the flag, the sign,
the word, of the enemy, Legh goes on to discuss honor and the house, the
oeconomy with all its practicalities. One can note, along with the learned
professor and antiquarian J.H. Baker, that the exemplum of the house is
26. LEGH, supra note 23, at fol. 133v.
27. The lawyer THOMAS BLOUNT, GLOSSOGRAPHIA (1656) is a useful source on the usages of the
period.
28. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND bk. 1II, ch.
4, § 301 (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., Robert H. Small 1853) (1628).
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originally the royal household and oeconomy, and that the court was in the
first instance the suite and following of the Crown, such that household
and law court, oeconomy and law were historically proximate if not
precisely synonymous. For Legh's purposes, by the mid-sixteenth
century, the exemplary houses are those of lawyers, the Inns of Court, and
they are modeled expressly on the heavenly hierarchy and the order of
angels: "Here I might compare your state (but that you are men) unto the
heavenly lerarches, for that you have the three thinges that lerarches have,
that is, Order, cunning and working." 2 9 It is in this context that we need to
understand the legal use and meaning of images as the form of
transmission and passage between iconomy and oeconomy, whereby the
meaning of the icon is reiterated in the lawyer's devices, pictures, and
emblems-sacrae notae all. The lawyers partake of the iconic and
embody the images of the virtues in the emblems of law. And so, without
further background digression, how is the enigma of Justice initially to be
understood?
Legh instances Justice as one of the four founding virtues that establish
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sword with his right hand to the sovereign. With his left he passes the
tablets of the law to a robed and hooded but sighted judge. The left hand
of the judge points towards the scales of justice, "the ballaunce of silver in
a fielde of blewe."" The visual connotation is clear enough. The judge
looks to the laws and reads the book. He does not look to the source of the
laws, nor does he blind himself by staring into the heavens. It is to the
earthly and tellurian, the leges terrae, that the judge will attend and it is
precisely by virtue of sight, through seeing the "dignity of every estate,"
by marking the differences of rich and poor, that the judge can protect the
weak and call the wealthy to perform the duties, the virtues and offices,
that their armorial devices portend and portray. Sight is essential to justice
and judgment. Causin, in his De Symbolica, a dictionary of hieroglyphs,
enigmas, and emblems, is as precise as any: the eyes are the protectors of
justice and the guardians of the body-oculos iustitiae servator, et custos
corporis.2 To give an instance from the very beginning of our period,
Erasmus is to the same effect. We can cite the frequent epigrams on the
priority of vision over hearing. The Adages of 1500 stipulate clearly that
greater faith should be placed in the eyes than in the ears, or in the
original oculis magis habenda fides, quam auribus. And we find that
theme taken up with proper Christian pride in a number of emblems
whose mottos indicate that night and lack of sight are equivalent to
ignorance. Everything is invisible in the darkness: res omnes caecus sunt
in tenebrae.3 3
Two further images support this initial point. Pierre Coustau, in an








Reproduced courtesy of the Rare
Book Collection, Lillian Goldman
Law Library, Yale Law School.
31. Preface to id.
32. NICOLO CAUSINO, DE SYMBOLICA AEGYPTIORUM SAPIENTIA, IN QUA SYMBOLA,
PARABOLAE, HISTORIAE SELECTAE, QUAE AD OMNEM EMBLEMATUM, AENIGMATUM,
HIEROGLYPHICORUM COGNITIONEM VIAM PRAESTANT 63 (Cologne, loannem Kinckium 1623).
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his eyes closed.34 The endearingly realistic woodcut is of a judge
unsighted by sleep. The immediate reference is precisely to inattention
and injustice. Somnus iustitium, the sleep of justice, technically the
suspension of justice, is here marked by night and lack of vision, precisely
because of the loss of the medium of the image and so the loss of the
means of passage between visible and invisible, impression and cause,
part and whole. Phantasms and not images occupy the sleeping judge, and
these specters of night and dream, with all due respect to Artemidorus and
Freud, bear only an indirect relation to diurnal reality. At least they
require interpretation of a sort that lawyers are neither wont nor willing to
provide. Compare the somnolent judge briefly to an armorial
representation of Justice, an introductory image from one of Gerard
Legh's contemporaries, John Bossewell, whose Concordes of Armorie
offers a somewhat severe-looking Justitia.3 5 Justice here is helmeted
Figure 7.
Emblem from Workes of
Armorie, John
Bossewell, 1572.
Permission granted, P. Goodrich.
against the threat of injustice, and her sword, unusually, is in her left
hand. Her eyes, wide open, look to the right and follow her arm, and
particularly her hand, which rests upon an escutcheon with the scales of
justice etched upon it. Justice is here put in "dexter" position, in primary
34. Figure 6.
35. Figure 7; see JOHN BOSSEWELL, WORKES OF ARMORIE DEVYDED INTO THREE BOOKES, at
fol. 5r (London, Totell 1572).
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place as the first defense against the violence of misinterpretation by the
unlearned and the misrecognition of those not trained to see. Insignia, and
here the Queen of virtues, Justitia, are the visible marks of community, of
peace through signs, and allow our author to signal, in Latin taken from
Isidore of Seville, that arma generaliter omnium rerum instrumenta
sunt." Signs, the codes of identity and norm, are the instruments and
means of all communication. They watch out and watch over the order of
honor and the proper disposition of things.
Bossewell, not unlike Legh, but with greater abstraction, dictates "that
the foundacion of perpetual prayse and renome, is Justice." She stands, as
figured in so English a style, with the history of women lawgivers, of
Boadicea and, when Bossewell was busy, Elizabeth I, the Virgin Queen,
as wide-eyed and watchful protectors of the kingdom." To them is given
the power and the glory, quite explicitly. And on the other side, returning
to the Latin, as Agamben has reminded us, is lustitium, the cessation of
justice." The Roman concept refers to what the English call the
dispensation of law, meaning the suspension of legal rule in response to
tumult and death. In the more Christian terms of the early moderns, it is
emblematic of darkness, breakdown, loss of order, absence of honor, and
lack of faith. Hence my suspicion-one that I will now pursue through a
genealogy of the image of Justice in relation to the blindfold-that the
eyes are the gates of justice and that if they are closed, if Justice can
neither see nor be seen, then access is denied.
II. THE FOOLOSOPHY OF JUSTICE
The Christian humanist imagery of a sacrosanct Justice and of
unsighted lawyers in sixteenth-century Europe operates to identify forms
of knowledge from which mortals are excluded, which they must glorify
without understanding. The iconic blindfold, which emerges precisely in
the course of the establishment of an Anglican common law that will
dispense a "knowledge of things both divine and human," functions
visually to remind common viewers that the human is separate from the
divine, and law from the justice to come. The enigma of the legal emblem
thus gains its greatest and most resounding expression in the image of
Justice blindfolded. The blindfold is not simply an enigma, a forgotten
reference to Homer nodding, to Theban anecdotes, to iustitium. Rather,
36. BOSSEWELL, supra note 35, at fol. Ir.
37. Id. at fol. 5v. On the history of women lawgivers, see JOHN SELDEN, JANI ANGLORUM FACIES
ALTERA (London, Impens. T.D. 1681) (1610). See also PETER GOODRDICH, OEDIPUS LEX: HISTORY,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, LAW (1995); Peter Goodrich, John Selden: The Accidental Feminist, in FEMINIST
THEORIES OF LAW (Maria Drakapoulou ed., 2012).
38. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 55ff (2005).
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the image itself is enigmatic. The blindfold is paradoxical in that it shows
but simultaneously censors; it displays without revealing; it is a portrait,
an image of a face, but the face is in material part covered. Justice masked
is justice unknown. It is this sense of the obvious and at the same time
obviously enigmatic that lies at the root of the depiction of the blindfold
and can be briefly retraced through the trajectory of its uses.
The blindfold has done the rounds. It is not invented by the Renaissance
humanist emblematists. The medieval era knew the blindfold, and there
are woodcut images, discussed by Christian-Nils Robert and noted also by
Resnik and Curtis, in which condemned prisoners, merchants and
lawyers, are depicted blindfolded when being executed. The bandage is
there most probably as a sign of punishment, of the condemned, and bears
connotations that go back to Oedipus, who tore out his eyes in penance
for his crimes." Many of the early images of Justice show her with empty
eye sockets rather than blindfolded, but there is in such cases the obvious
visual difficulty that without an explanation for the absence of eyes, the
woodcut looks simply as though it was poorly executed or that Justice has
had a bad night. It is, in any event, this primary association of the
blindfold with censure and incapacity that will be developed here. The
most famous instance of such an image is that of Christ mocked, by
Michael Wolgemut, to whom Albrecht Direr was apprenticed, in which a
sedentary Christ in a bare room is beaten, spat upon, blindfolded, and
bloodied.40 The defacement is punitive and salutary, a warning against the
worship of idols and the reification of vision. It is this theme of
castigation and sacrifice that is picked up in the famous image from
Sebastian Brant's early satirical treatise from 1494, Ship of Fools
(Stultifera navis). The image is well known and too readily available in
this erudite context to require reproduction here. It shows a clown, replete
with hat and bells, placing a blindfold over the eyes of a seated figure of
Justice, sword in her right hand, scales in her left. The window behind and
to her left is small and barred. The window to her right is open and looks
onto a scene of civic buildings and a spire. The past is behind her and
invisible, and can neither be judged nor balanced, while the future is
blank, precluded, and unknowable by dint of the blindfold.
There is a hint of Janus in the image, and I will return to that later, but
39. The comprehensive study is now JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE:
INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011).
See also ROBERT JACOB, IMAGES DE LA JUSTICE (1994); CHRISTIAN-NILS ROBERT, LA JUSTICE DANS
SES DECORS (2006); CHRISTIAN-NILS ROBERT, LA JUSTICE, VERTU, COURTISANE ET BOURREAU 80-83
(1993).
40. Michael Wolgemut & workshop, Mocking of Christ, from SKETCHBOOK (ca. 1490) (pen and
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immediately it is the role of the clown that is crucial and somewhat
laconically remarked upon in the literature. Brant was a lawyer and
sometime-dean of the faculty of law at Basel, and his image is explained
in the accompanying and generally vernacular verse-there are several
editions-in terms of human folly blinding justice. The text berates those
who "ever contend in discord and in strife" and "delight" in going to law
over "small trifles . . . scantly worth a straw." 4 1 Yet it hardly needs to be
said that, obvious though the image appears to be, it indicates much more
than at first appears. Attention should be paid to the clown because it is
the human and the civic that errs, that confuses, divagates, and leads
astray in much the same manner as those that mocked and tormented and
sacrificed Christ. To err is human. Justice and law are constant,
immutable, beyond memory, and inviolable. As Coke later put it, in
hominis vitium, non professionis: men err but law never. So too for Brant,
the clown is not merely a symbol of human frailty and marital discord, it
is much more specifically a figure of unlearning and of ignorance. The
further and more esoteric reference of the image and symbolism of justice
is to degeneration in the study and transmission of the antique law.
Justitia represents a timeless and divine rectitude and mercy, force and
balance, that is best approximated and learned through the classical texts
and the ancient law. Priscajurisprudentia was to be recovered, polished,
passed on. Brant was concerned that the humanistic letters, the Sybilline
leaves of antique law were being thrown over in favor of the vernacular
and contemporary. This, as Brant and later humanists vocally complained,
most notably, to my mind Hotman in his invective Anti-Tribonian, was
vandalism, legal barbarism, the work of fools as the image portrays.42
Take it a step further. If focus is maintained upon the clown, then the
primary indication of the image is that in fact, ironically, perturbingly
even, it is the clown, the one who blindfolds, who cannot see. They take
the place of those who in Wolgemut's sketch mock Christ. It is those who
do the mocking and the wounding that are the real victims, the eternal
renegades. This is the inverted world of the carnival, of bacchanal and
saturnalia, and augurs ill for the Christian realm. It is Justice whom the
artist has rendered invisible, defaced, wounded and lame. If it is the
clown, the human who cannot see, then the blindfold is satirical and by
inversion marks the invisibility of Justice, her absence. Even though it is a
somewhat esoteric illustration of this point, a common Renaissance
anecdote, or at least common to humanists and lawyers, concerns
41. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 39, at 67-69, and accompanying images.
42. See FRANCOIS HOTMAN, ANTI-TRIBONIAN OU DISCOURS D'UN GRAND ET RENOMMI
JURISCONSULTE DE NOSTRE TEMPS SUR L'ESTUDE DES LOIX (Paris, Perrier 1603) (1567). I cannot
resist pointing out that anti-Tribonian is at least phonetically ambiguous, meaning against Tribonian,
but also before Tribonian, which is precisely the import and aim of Hotman's argument.
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Accursius, the author of the Glossa ordinaria, the early standard legal
treatise. He had a daughter, so the story goes.43 And she excelled in law.
She was female and beautiful. She wanted to teach law, to be virtuous like
her father. For this to be possible it was arranged that she should lecture
from behind a screen or, in other versions, while wearing a veil. This way
the law students would not be distracted from their studies nor blinded by
amorous inclinations. She would simply seem to be a young man. So the
story goes, and so it is repeated in our era. The veil protected the
spectators, not the speaker. It guarded the vulnerable from the
importuning of sight, from the lust of their eyes. And we may legitimately
expect that if veils and blindfolds turn up again in this era, then one strong
implication of the image will be of a veil that renders the all-too-human
viewers unsighted. The lure of the image, the lust that a beautiful face
generates, the distraction of the flesh, is here obviated.
Back now to my narrative of juridical uses. When the image of the
blindfold returns, in Alciatus's Emblemata of 1531, it appears in the form
of a cover over the eyes of "the good prince" as a marker of a humorous
kind, accompanied by the image of a council that have their hands
amputated. The immediate sense of the image is that it mocks and
shames. Politicians should not take bribes, nor should the sovereign be
seduced by the appearance of petitioners. Barthelbmy Aneau reproduces
the same image of the good prince in the Jurisprudentia." So too, just to
be nationalistic for a moment and concentrate on common law, does
Thomas Palmer in the first vernacular English emblem book, Two
Hundred Poosees, of 1565.45 But that need not detain me here. The point
to stress is that the most popular law book ever written, outside of the
Corpus Juris, expressly arrived on the juristic stage genus jocosum, as a
satirical, at times obscene work of moralizing precepts aimed to inform,
instruct, and amuse those learned in law and the arts. 46 The story is well
.enough known. Alciatus composed a collection of adages in the style of
Erasmus. These were verbal maxims in Latin with short accompanying
explanations and elaborations that were intended for the Saturnalia-
43. My version of the anecdote is taken from a work that defends Mary Queen of Scots, and the
regiment of women: JOHN LESLIE, A DEFENCE OF THE HONOUR OF THE RIGHT HIGHE, MIGHTYE AND
NOBLE PRINCESS MARIE QUEENE OF SCOTLANDE AND DOWAGER OF FRANCE, at fol. 193r (London,
Dicaeophile 1569).
44. Figure 8.
45. THE EMBLEMS OF THOMAS PALMER: Two HUNDRED POOSEEs 25 (John Manning ed., AMS
Press 1988) (ca. 1565) ("[T]hese images well dighte ... The Kinge is blinde what meanethe this? /
forsothe with one affecte / He heres the cawse, sees not the man / nor hathe to hym respecte.").
46. The classic study is PAUL VIARD, ANDRt ALCIAT, 1492-1550 (1926). For a recent study, see
Pierre Laurens, L'invention de I'emblame par Andre Alciat et le modile dpigraphique, in 149
ACADEMIE DES INSCRIPTIONS ET BELLES-LETTRES 883 (2005). I should add for the sake of future
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festivis horis-and for which he coined the title Emblems. He sent these to
his publisher, the Augsburg printer Heinrich Steyner who, without the
author's permission, added woodcut images to the epigrams and their
explanations. The rest is, in one sense, history.
Figure 8. Emblem from Jurisprudentia, Barth6lemy Aneau, page 34, 1554,
Lyon, Bonhomme.
Reproduced courtesy of the Bibliothtlue nationale de Frunce.
The prince who wears a blindfold, and to an even greater extent the
counselors who have their hands amputated, are fools, a salutary lesson
and moral depiction of those condemned for crimes against the common
good. That theme usually recurs in the later editions of Alciatus, as in the
first vernacular emblem books, in relation to the blindfolded Cupid,
indicative of the folly of love. Also common are blindfolds on Fortuna
and less frequently on those whom Death, a dark skeletal figure, will take
away. Fortuna is an intermediate example, and we find her naked,
blindfolded, and masked a second time by an expansive sail in the first
vernacular emblem book, Perridre's Theatre. This depiction is critical and
parodic. It is the blind who follow Fortune's lead. And when the blind are
led by the blind only disaster and darkness can follow.47 An even more
explicit instance can be taken, for reasons of diversity, from the second
47. PERRIERE, supra note 5, at 20; see also COMBE, supra note 5, at 20.
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vernacular emblem book, Corrozet's Hecatomographie of 1540.48
Corrozet is, if anything, more direct and virulent. Fortune lies and on
account of her mendacity is thrust out of the heavens. In the emblem she
Figure 9. Emblem from Hecatomographie, Gilles Corrozet.
Reproduced courtesy of the University of Glasgow Library, Special Collections.
is depicted as being thrown out of the human house as well. She should
not be obeyed on earth, at sea, or in the sky because she importunes, is
inconstant, and leads astray. She is shown blindfolded, one arm in a sling,
a weight on the other, as she is hurried out the door and into darkness. The
message is simple: be gone. The future cannot be known, and the winds of
chance, Fortuna, is neither guide nor friend in its denouements.
One other instance of the blindfold in a satirical setting can also be
taken from Perribre's Theatre. It is highly indicative and picks up on the
less obvious meaning of the blindfold, namely the unknowable quality of
the future and, in Christian terms, the afterlife. Emblem 93 is of
marriage.4 9 Under a proscenium style of arch, in the theater of the
theological and social, a priest in cassock and frock stands framed by
what appears to be a chancel. The husband is portrayed blindfolded, with
his hands also bound. Around his neck is a chain by which he is further
ensnared by the bride around whose waist the chain is locked. This, in the
Christian tradition, is a literal image of wedlock, of voluntary servitude,
the prison we choose, the golden chains of marriage. That said, the
"happy couple" look about as unhappy, as downcast and depressed, as
could possibly be imagined. There is no joy in this marriage, and the
reason for this is not entirely obvious. The immediate ground given for
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the blindfold and chains is that a wife should be chosen for virtue and not
for looks. If she is beautiful, then others "will be fingring of the chinke"
and will cause unhappiness and destruction by having their hand in the
pie, to borrow from Combe's rather graphic version of this emblem.so
The doctrinal meaning of the image follows from the warning given. In
loving virtue, we must love not the body, not the woman, but the faith, the
Church, Christ. The marriage is ultimately to God and to the future, and
the body, here the woman, is simply a vehicle to everlasting life. As with









of the University of
Glasgow Library,
Special Collections.
blindness to earthly things but also the unknowable character of the
future. This theme is important not only to the destiny of faith but also to
the imagery of justice. Brant's Justice is depicted very clearly as being
blindfolded and so blinded in relation both to the past and future, while to
her side an open window at least provides potential access to the present
and the civic. These could be seen, but they are not. Yet her defaced
visage is not turned to the actual; it faces the front, the future, in a play
upon temporality and faith that we find taken up in several emblems of
Janus. The face that looks forward looks to the future, and this is often
50. COMBE, supra note 5, at 93.
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depicted by a key, the clavis regni or key to the kingdom to come." The
blindfold signifies perhaps the limitation of vision, and we find this most
expressly in Damhoudere's famous emblem of Justice with two faces in
the 1572 French edition of Practique ludiciare es causes civiles.52 It is the
future that worldly Justice cannot see, and the blindfold here makes that
fact visible and evident. It is a point that I can reinforce by considering a
rather extraordinary figure of a three-headed satyr at the beginning of The
Foolosophy.5 3
The image of the satyr is accompanied by an honorific dedicatory poem
to the author, which explains that our lawyer Perribre is the most learned









augment your glory in the present, but it is in the future that you will be
crowned. The image, however, hints at a slightly different story. It would
be easy to miss, so I will point it out. The winged satyr has a bearded and
Socratic face turned to the past. It is in full relief and clearly depicted. The
face looking out to the present is only half in the light, and half in shadow,
in tenebras. The face that looks to the future and to the crown of laurels is
wholly in shadow, ill-defined, and dark. The implication again is that the
future is invisible and, whether blindfolded or not, eyes are useless if the
51. See GABRIEL ROLLENHAGEN, NUCLEUS EMBLEMATORUM SELECTISSIMORUM, at II.4
(Cologne, Crispiani 1611); GEORGE WITHER, A COLLECTION OF EMBLEMES ANCIENT AND
MODERENE 138 (London, Allot 1635).
52. JOOST DE DAMHOUDERE, PRACTIQUE IUDICIARE Es CAUSES CIVILES TRES UTILE ET
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future is the object of vision. It is all dark, all night. And, as Saint
Augustine fondly relays, one sees through faith and by means of oculi
animi-that is, by spiritual vision-all of that kingdom that is not and has
no being, that is intima non extima, as the lawyers were wont to say.
For our immediate purposes, the intimation of the latter emblem is
important to the reconstruction of the image of Justice sighted and
lawyers blindfolded that Aneau will later borrow from Perribre's
Foolosophy.54 First note the obvious title, Morosophie, after Erasmus and
his Encomiae moriae of 1509. It is part of a now-venerable tradition in




de la Perribre, page 17,
1555, Lyon, Bonhomme.
Reproduced courtesy of the University
of Glasgow Library, Special
Collections.
and should be interpreted, at least here, in that vein. It shows Justitia fully
sighted and declaiming from the book of the laws to the muddled,
blindfolded assembly of lawyers. This suggests, foolosophically, that
lawyers do not see very much and are indeed impeded in their efforts by
their inability, their failure to read the law and to apply it to the future.
The blindfold, which incapacity they share in this image with Cupid,
marks their cupidity, to be sure, but also their confusion, limitation, and
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remarked on in an earlier satirical dialogue, Battista Fiera's On Painting
Justice, published in 1515, which has been most usefully recuperated and
discussed in Representing Justice. For Fiera it is all very clear and easily
stated: nothing is clear. Indeed, non pingi posse lusticiam-Justice cannot
be painted.5 Justice is beyond human comprehension, she belongs to
another sphere and the blindfold signals to keep out, noli sapere altum,
not to blind yourself, not to burn your wings, not to wound or mutilate a
fragile mortality by trying to know beyond your mortal station. Justitia's
blindfold signifies a double message. On the one hand, it shows clearly
and painfully the limits of lawyers, their earthly incapacities, their
downcast bent. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, it also
indicates more esoterically a classical mythological order and the
accompanying ascetic rites and occult ceremonies in which they
participate. To understand the theatre of justice and truth, and the
circulation of imagery in the sixteenth-century common-law tradition, it is
necessary to appreciate the political theology of sovereign rule into which
the lawyer was arduously apprenticed. The lawyer had to learn, to see and
understand, the divinity immanent in human customs and dimly glimpsed
in the practice of law.
III. ANEAU'S JURISPRUDENTIA
What does the borrowed image, the found emblem, that Aneau uses in
the Jurisprudentia mean? Should we even inquire? Do we need to know?
One could take the advice of Robert Burton and shore up Fiera's
conclusion. The melancholic Burton opines, "when you see the cover,
why ask about the thing hidden? It was therefore covered, because he
should not know what was in it. Seek not after that which is hid .... "56
Keep out is the message, and Democritus Junior believes, it seems, that
the instruction is sound and to be observed. But of course Burton never
followed his own advice. He revealed, for example, that he was the author
of the work attributed ironically on the title page to Democritus Junior. So
he lifted the cover and took off the mask. Using Aneau's textual emblem,
we will endeavor to do the same.
55. BATTISTA FIERA, DE JUSTICIA PIGENDA 23 (London, Lion & Unicorn Press 1957) (1515).
56. DEMOCRITUS JUNIOR, THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY 3 (Oxford, Cripps 1628).
164 [Vol. 24:141
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Figure 13. Title page to Codex D. Justiniani Imp. Aug., in Justinian I, Corpus Juris
Civilis, 1548, Lyon, Senneton Frdres.
Source: Biblioth&que municipale de Lyon, 21511. Crddit photographique Biblioth&que municipale de Lyon, Didier Nicole.
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Aneau can even be our guide. In Picta poesis, published two years
before Jurisprudentia, he elaborates elliptically upon his method. At the
conclusion of the preface to the work he reports, "I have at times been
forced to follow my own conjectures and divinations and rather than
adapting the images to the words I have sought the words best suited to
the images."" Aneau is an emblematist to the core, one could say. What
matters is what we see, the images of the good, the clear-sightedness of
justice. An earlier and even more esoteric reference, brilliantly elaborated
upon by Hayaert, can also lend support. Aneau prepared the images for
the Senneton brothers' edition of the Corpus luris Civilis, published in
Lyon between 1548 and 1550.58 The frontispiece to the Codex bears a
striking image and an illuminating motto.59 There is too much on which to
comment, but consider the statement: Qud pallam est oculis forma,
iudicjis fide. It is hardly Latin that Cicero would recognize but means in
effect that "faithful judgment occurs when law is put clearly before the
eyes." Evidence, if ever there was, that law and vision, the ability to see
the law and to see the facts of the matter in vivo are essential to justice.6 0
It is the visibility of law, the frontal representation of the invisible order
and hierarchy, that the title page so clearly illustrates. At the top, angels
trumpet and surround Homer, whose chains bind Moses and Solon and
then pass by their hands, via Dracon and Ceres, to a judge, who chooses
jurors by lot. The lower center image-the nombril point-is of the
Senneton salamander and represents the fire of virtue that will drive evil
away. In the next image, as if immediately to figure the titular image, we
have an emblem of "the most sacred prince Justinian," who has collected
the kernel of the antique law and now passes it on to the people.6 1
Justinian is crowned and robed with a rod of office in his right hand,
while with his left he points to scribes, notaries, and lawyers, who are
inscribing his laws in a great book. Justinian is sighted well enough and
looks down, while the lawyers avert their eyes from the sovereign so as to
capture collectively and scripturally what Justinian dictates from his
throne.
57. BARTHELEMY ANEAU, PICTA POESIS UT PICTURA POESIS ERIT 6 (Lyon, Bonhomme 1552).
58. CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS (Lyon, Senneton 1548-1550). The bibliographical details are discussed
at length in HAYAERT, supra note 3, at ch. 6. It is to her that I owe both my thanks and the digital
copies of emblems from that work.
59. Figure 13.
60. Another example, which I will not pursue here, can be taken from a later emblem book.
FRANCIS QUARLES, EMBLEMS DIVINE AND MORAL TOGETHER wITH HIEROGLYPHICS OF THE LIFE OF
MAN (Bristol, Landsdown 1808) (1630) shows justice, blindfolded, bringing a sinner before a
cherubic Christ. Christ is writing and looks up to see and dismiss justice for her rigidity and lack of
clemency. She cannot see, whereas Christ "beholds" the sinner: "I spy my Father's image in the
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Figure 14 (left). Emblem from Justinian I, Corpus Juris Civilis, Digestum, col. 11.
Figure 15 (right). Emblem from Justinian I, Corpus Juris Civilis, Codex D.
lustiniani Imp. Aug., tit. I col. 1. 1548, Lyon, Senneton Frbres.
Source: Bibliotheque municipale de Lyon, 21511. Cr6dit photographique Bibliotheque municipale de Lyon, Didier Nicole.
The name Justinian comes of course from Jus, law, which term itself
derives from Justitia, or so we are informed in the first sentences of the
first book of the Digest. Ponder that a moment, and then consider the
accompanying emblem in the Senneton Corpus, an image of Justice
62
sitting down with Law. Law sits naked on a pedestal with the
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The image of law is of strict judgment, of geometric rule, of line and text
inexorably leading to determination whatever the consequences-pereat
mundus one could say. Opposite law, seated slightly higher, her face
turned upwards in contrast to law's downcast eyes, is Justitia. She too is
naked, Edenic, or angelic, as one wishes, and has a band, a "skarfe,"
around her head while she proffers to law the sword and the scales of
justice. This is her gift. A sighted divinity teaching from on high,
modeling virtue in visible form to the benefit of a rather constrained and
constricting figure of legality.
The image from the Senneton edition could as well have been used in
the introduction to Aneau's Jurisprudentia, which was in all probability
its source. Turning then, now, a long time later, because these images are
not easy to recuperate at such a great temporal, geographical, and
doctrinal distance, to the immediate context of his Justitia, the initial,
obvious-though-forgotten point,
is to look at the progression of
images in Jurisprudentia. Our
opening figure, Justitia on her
pedestal above the blind
attorneys, does not appear ex
P P, V'tuF,,NootE nihilo but rather in the context
and combination of the other
images in the text, the
accompanying trajectory of
emblems, of icunculae, as they
were once termed.63 The jurists
follow their own poetic and
aesthetic criteria, their own
spectral laws. To begin to insert
V GD V N Ithis image in its proper context
M. DN L1311* we should start with the title
page, its emblem and other
images. Here jurisprudence is
presented as upon a stage.64 The
arch above the title shows
Figure 16. Title page to Jurisprudentia, Justitia in the clouds, with both
Barth61emy Aneau, 1554, Lyon, Bonhomme. sword and scales in her left
Reproduced courtesy of the Bibliothque nationale de France. hand. In her right she holds
63. The immediate source for this term is THOMAS PHILIPOT, A BRIEF HISTORICAL DISCOURSE
OF THE ORIGINAL AND GROWTH OF HEARLDRY DEMONSTRATING UPON WHAT RATIONAL
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Nomos, law, while a heavenly hand emerges from an arm-like cloud to
hold Nomos from above. To the right, angels cavort, eyes open, wings
spread. To the left, angels descend to the outstretched arms of the angel of
knowledge (metaphysic in the later tradition), who stands upon a globe,
and then below to harmony, who stands upon a slain dragon. To the right,
the angels of justice descend to the figure of Pythagoras with his measures
and then to Mercury, while at the bottom of the frontispiece the human
stage is represented by a small island, circled by a serpent biting its tail
and so forming a ring on which a lamb, the sign of Christianity, stands.
That is the frame, the order of things, of signs and meanings, of power
and law, force and justice made visible and present.65 In the center is the
title page emblem, a version of Astrologus and of the maxim tendit ad
alta, which warns against human hubris and argues that Nomos should
rule from above while the subjects of law look up from below but ought
not to try to climb too high. Here very clearly, and not solely in the
subtitle (a primo et divino sui ortu), the angels rule above while our
crowned and winged Nomos passes on the trusts of law by means of
images. Aneau signs the work visually with the emblem of his name, a
ring (Annulum) with flowers, flores legum, growing through it. The image
of the name, not the name itself, but rather its visible figure, its symbol,
something more, its meaning and possibility, which the Christians of the
period might term verba-nomina-visibilia, the visible word, the
sacrament.
The next image of invocation or prayer is even more direct and
disconcerting to modern eyes. A subject, the burden of the human on his
back, is on his knees, supine, abased, genuflecting, arms outstretched,
65. MARC FUMAROLLI, L'tCOLE DU SILENCE: LE SENTIMENT DES IMAGES AU XVIP SItCLE 325
(1994). 'Le seuil des livres' provides a helpful discussion of the connotations and doctrinal
implications of these opening images.
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invoking divine aid and succor. The pleading subject raises his face to
the light that emanates from the clouds, from above, from the beyond. If
the image of invocation were not evident enough, the next image of
paternity, both divine and human, shows a child pointing at an old man
and asking whence he, the child, came. The astronomer responds that
the old man sitting under a tree is the father of the child's body and that
the angel of justice, winged and armed with sword and scales, is the
maker of his soul. The divine Justitia is here both airborne and sighted, a
mark of visible origin and of pending authority. It is the supreme impiety
(summa impietas) to refuse to recognize your father and not to reverence
the divine.
Figure 18. Emblem from Jurisprudentia, Barthdlemy Aneau, page 8,
Lyon, Bonhomme.
Reproduced courtesy of the Bibliothque nationale de France.
1554,
The child is father to the man, and in the next image of devotion and
civic virtue, we see in the background a temple and praying figures and in
the foreground prostrate humans behind two large figures flinging rocks.
Danger gives rise to belief, and experience teaches reason. The figures
in the foreground are Deucalion and Pyrrha, two survivors of a great
flood, according to Greek mythology. Their statuary presence here
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overcome, lead to eloquence, virtue, justice, and law. Blindfolded, heads
covered, their mantles billowing behind them, they are statuary emblems
that warn against chance and folly in favor of worship and civic virtue.
The statues are shown holding stones, which they throw behind them to
form children to re-propagate humanity after the deluge. There are various
versions of the myth in Ovid and pseudo-Apollodorus, but here it is
enough to point to the covering of the head as the mark of human
incapacity, of gratitude and praise for all that cannot be seen and must be
obeyed according to the logic of myth. It is indeed poetry, the mythical
narratives and theatrical performances of Seers, that allow us, according
to Aneau in his next disquisition, to understand and interpret the gods.
Figure 19. Emblem from Jurisprudentia by Barth61emy Aneau, page 9,
1554, Lyon, Bonhomme, 1554.
Reproduced courtesy of the Bibliothdque nationale de France.
This leads him to the homines sacer who will give and interpret the laws,
who will bring community and agreement through wisdom and strong
rule. Fiction, the moralizing stories of the ancients, the narratives of myth,
ground knowledge and law in antiquity, eloquence, and art. Such then is
the image relay that subtends and traverses our specific emblem of
Justice.
Proceeding ad apparentiam, according to the succession of images
rather than their reduction to textual and literal explanations, we are in a
position to properly view the next picture in the progression of images.
This shows Justitia sighted and the lawyers blindfolded. What now of this
Justitia? Begin by treating the image as following directly from the
2012] 171
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previous depictions of the angelological, acclamatory, and mythical. She
is no longer winged and flying but nonetheless, even though now on the
earth and amongst men, she is on a pedestal, above and looking down.
Justitia's head, replete with halo, is held in nubibus, in the clouds. Two
markers of the divine already light her place and performance, two of
what Agamben, in his study of oeconomy, The Power and the Glory,
terms the crescendo of optical metaphors that accompany the biblical
description of the divine. And then a third optical reference. Jusititia is
sighted and has the book of laws in her left hand, while her right hand is
outstretched, signifying power, eloquence, and donation.69 She is giving
the law, and the law is divine, comes from above, from pater noster, from
the great elevator and, in the humanist vernacular, Our Father. Contrary to
the convention in statuary and other depictions of Justitia, she is sighted
and declaims the law, while it is the lawyers who are blindfolded and who
look ahead or down as Cupid, also blindfolded, walks among them.
The lawyers cannot see and indeed hardly appear to be listening. They
are rather stumbling around, oblivious to the light, blind and all too
human. One interpretation, Aneau's suggestion in his accompanying text,
is straightforwardly humanistic. He aims to restore prisca jurisprudentia,
the full, classical text, unadulterated by Tribonian's adulterations,
interpolations, excisions and other barbarisms. To take out the so-called
emblemata Triboniani, the false emendations of the compilers of the
Corpus Juris, required extreme erudition inherited from not only the most
ancient expositors (antiquissimi expositores) but also the most recent
angelic legal luminaries of his own era, the Bartolists (succedentes
maxime insignes). In this aspect the blindfold on the lawyers is a mark of
asceticism and learning, the visible representation of the Pythagorean
doctrine of a lengthy and arduous apprenticeship to knowledge, of many
years spent fasting and studying, according to lamblichus, before the
subject was worthy to join the ranks of the learned. The blindfold marked
deprivation, self-abnegation, and purification.
Why the deprivation and ascetic rites? For Aneau, this training was
both to prepare the lawyer-interpreter for a better world and its higher law
and to link the subject to the mythological roots of prisca jurisprudentia.
Chief amongst such myths is that nomos is immanent and, properly
speaking, partially visible in practices and patterns, customs and uses of
the quotidian world. The text, in its purest, most practical, and longest-
retained form is not written but rather is inscribed in the heart because,
according to another maxim, omnia scrinia habet in pectore sua. Thus
69. The outstretched right arm signifies power-a long hand ofauthority-as well as protection.
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Lycurgus of Sparta, also a Greek, forbade the law from being written
because writing would lead only to forgetfulness, whereas law should be
embodied, internalized, emblematized, and thrown within. It should be
written on the heart, lived, breathed, imbibed, ingested, and even sneezed
according to the English civilian William Fulbeck. Hence the first point,
which comes as something of a surprise: the blindfold signifies the
unwritten law, ius non scriptum, the English lawyer's deformation
professionelle, except that here, as almost everywhere else, the English
legal condition is simply that of having forgotten their Roman sources.
If you cannot see it, you have to look elsewhere, to use the inner eye,
the eye of the spirit, and to search for law non extima sed intima. And
from the picture of Justitia declaring the law, just as her temporal
namesake, Justinian, declares it in the opening image of the Senneton
Codex, the law should first be apprehended, listened for, heard as it rises
through anamnesis from within. Listen but do not look is also a
prohibition and should be understood as such. Not to be able to see is a
human adversity, a disability, at the least a suspension of sight so as to
allow for the apprehension of the sub-auditory murmurings of mythos, of
custom and use as they embody nature and law. While this may have a
moralizing message, it is really no more than a species of homage, of
passing under the yoke, of recognizing that we are below and that
lawgivers and Justitia are above and beyond.
CONCLUSION
Last words. Final images. The blindfold on Aneau's lawyers represents
an injunction not to look, not to stare upon the earthly realm, let alone the
divinity on high until they are ready, trained, and able. It is an ascetic and
salutary indication of the limitations of the lawyer and of the subservience
that they must display. It is not Justitia who is blind. As adumbrated, and
irrefragably, even if there was a blindfold on Justitia it would not signify
that she could not see but rather that she could not be seen. Aneau thus
offers the image of the lawyers blindfolded to make more apparent and
somewhat more comic and engaging, somewhat more foolosophical and
accessible, the theological message of the image, namely that only those
who have joined the order of the angels, only the holy lawyers, the super-
illustrious, the spectacularly dignified, the iuris periti, or in reality the
legal doctors of Bourges from whom Aneau hoped to obtain a university
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And where does this leave us with Justitia and her blindfold? Return for
a moment to Pierre Coustau's Pegma of 1555. The title of the work, a
thoroughly legal intervention, refers to a theatrical machinery that raises
and lowers actors and props onto and off the stage. His work begins with
three images, a triunity of emblems of Justice. I offered initially, to set the
stage, the image of Justitia against corrupt judges, according to Nigidus.
She sits on a cloud, a sword in her right hand, cleaving a path between the
stars. There is nothing much for humans in this, save the proper reverence
and filial fear that should be shown to the superabundant and astrological.
Stay away, keep out, do not burn your wings and fall to the ground. The
preceding image, the first emblem that our lawyer uses, is another image
of Justice, after Chrysippus. 7 0 Justitia, again sighted, has her breasts
Figure 20. Emblem from Pegma: cum narrationibus philosophicis, Pierre Coustau,
page a4r, 1555, Lyon, Matthias Bonhomme.
Reproduced courtesy of the Rare Book Collection, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School.
exposed and is feeding twin babies. Justice is here a nursing mother, a
loving parent, who on her right breast nurtures war and on her left feeds
milk-knowledge, doctrine, hope-to law. She is seated on a bench, and
behind her is a drape that frames the spectacle, a blindfold removed if you
will. Justice suckles dependents and fosters dependency, infants who exist
only in her shadow (umbraculis iustitiae), the supine and the acclamatory.
Returning then to Justitia and the blindfold that returns to cover the
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be in any doubt as to the political theology that this image conveys. The
picture belongs squarely within iconomus, within the providential
machinery of legal legitimacy and conveys in a relatively simple form a
visible expression of a transcendent justice that cannot and should not be
seen. Rex regnat sed non gubernat, the king rules but does not govern,
according to one pertinent maxim. And the image of a blindfolded Justice
does indeed signal in a fairly direct manner a divinity that will be of no
help and will in essence do nothing. A Justice that exists in the heavens
will not act in the world, as Coustau indicates in his earlier depiction after
Nigidus. Humans must look to their own and do what is best, Coustau
opines in his extrapolation of the image. Justitia exists within the domain
of Deus otiosus and rex inutilis, an object of devotion and praise but not
of any actual rule or extant oeconomy and administration. We might find
her humorous really, as another ornamental divinity, except that, as I have
argued, far from being useless, otiose in law-speak, she serves the
legitimating function of holding the human down and keeping the
supplicants, the peasants, out of the law and away from their future.
The political theology of the blindfold is suggestive simply of the
religious sentiments and repression that this image unconsciously
conveys. The fact that we now discuss this image in secularized contexts
only serves to remind us that secularization displaces religious forces into
earthly settings while leaving their power and sanctity intact. These are
still liturgical images, solemnized and ceremonial legal trophies that
generally stand on the facades of public buildings, on the pinnacles of
courthouses, on the ceilings of legal rotundas, or engraved behind judicial
thrones. The locations are points of the highest significance as instances
of passage and entry, of first sight, and they are usually accompanied by
intimidation and fear of the unfamiliar. Here is the immediate and visible
aura of law, signifying a site of purity and consecration, of solemnity and
ritual. It is equally an incomprehensible or enigmatic image of Justice,
which even after the 668 pages in dual columns of Representing Justice,
remains to be commented on further and reviewed again. What I have
argued is that the blindfold marks a separation, a cleavage, that holds
apart the human and the divine, the oeconomic and the iconomic, the
mundane and the glorious.
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What next? What is sacred, according to a rather different tradition,
should be profaned, made human, put to novel use. And what is separate
should be conjoined. It is time,.in other words, in different images, to be
playful, foolosophical with Justitia. We need to be weened, made a little
less dependent, a touch more irreverent, when it comes to justice and the
politics of law. That surely is why the image of Justitia sighted appears
first in the Foolosophy of la Perribre. The foolosophical is all to do with
profanation, with making human, asserting authorship, and looking freely
at the actual as opposed to the mythical sources of law. A final example
from the Foolosophy, that great work of early French theory, an image of
a blindfold being made, of Fortuna becoming an image.7 ' The figure
shows a sculptor, the first image-maker, in doctoral robe and hat, chipping
Figure 21. Emblem from La Morosophie, Guillaume de la Perribre,
page 88, 1555, Lyon, Bonhomme.
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with a chisel on a slab an image of Fortuna. The sculptor, the lawyer, the
artificer makes the image and simultaneously shows that the image is
blind. Fortuna is depicted naked, with her sail in her hand and a blindfold
covering her eyes. She is the fool, but it is we that make her. Note also the
staging of this image, the frame, which shows an angel directly above,
winged and looking down. All things are visible to those non-beings
whom we cannot see, the angels, the honored, the acclaimed. At the same
time, to the side a human body with a goat's head and a serpent for a leg
looks toward the image, the simulacrum. It is hardly incidental that the
sculptor is poised to carve Fortuna's right breast, the mammary of war,
whereas the left breast, that of law, has been formed. Beneath it are the
tools of measurement and inscription. There could be hints here of the







to be able to shoot their bow better, but the proper significance is that it is
fate, the realm of administration, that is blinded and in need of rescue. We
need, the Morosophie here depicts and paints, a better judge than chance,
and a wiser law than fate.
It is time then to come to terms with the political theology of the
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blindfold on Justice and the accompanying wounds of lawyers. Time to
move beyond the cold censure of images in Calvinism and to come up
with our own imaginations. Images must be taken seriously precisely
because they are the source of justice and the origin of the invention of
law. The occasion of the visual in the legal, of visible laws, is that of
renewing the tradition, that of making it ours first by understanding it and
then by radicalizing it. In that spirit I could do worse than end with the
work of a guerrilla artist who placed a three-and-a-half ton, twenty-foot
tall statue of Justice in the heart of the city of London.72 Modeled on the
statue of Justice that sits on top of the Old Bailey, Banksy offers a
plebeian and irreverent image of Justice in a thong, with thigh high boots
and a garter in which a dollar has been slipped. She has a blindfold as
well, an eye-thong, one might say. I make no argument for the merits of
the statue, only for the process and the form. It is foolosophical and offers
the appropriate message: enough with the juridical hagiography; enough
with the political theology that separates transcendent from immanent,
acclamatory from practical, eyes from sight. The image of Justice is there
simply and only to encourage participation, critical play, entry into rather
than exclusion from the oeconomics of administration and government.
The blindfold on Justitia is a forgotten reference to exclusion and to the
accompanying though inarticulate mythology of law, of divine origin and
hidden sources. It is our tradition, of course, and it needs to be learned and
renewed, diagnosed and treated. Our common law is one that still silently
manifests a belief in its own theogonic legitimacy, one that portrays in
words the affect and effect of the indefinite time of the most antiquated
and oldest of laws, of rules nascent beyond the memory of humanity.
What is beyond memory should eventually be forgotten but in the positive
sense of recollection and surpassing. You cannot forget what you do not
know. You simply repeat it. It is only the process of recovering,
reworking, and returning to images that allows for invention and novelty,
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